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In October 1942, the Federal Council of Churches’ (FCC) Commission to Study the Bases of 
a Just and Durable Peace produced a pamphlet containing fourteen articles supporting the 
case for religion playing a greater part in any post-war international system.1 The lead article 
was penned by John Foster Dulles—one-time member of the U.S. delegation to the Paris 
Peace Conference, partner in the prestigious Sullivan & Cromwell law firm, future secretary 
of state under Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the head of the FCC Commission since 1940. 
Though most of Dulles’s essay called on the American people to embrace religion more 
readily, it also featured a section that equated the acceptance of religion with the capacity to 
counter the threat posed by a series of transnational forces. The trauma and exhaustion of the 
First World War, Dulles wrote, had led to the creation of a “spiritual vacuum” and caused the 
gap in men’s hearts and minds to be filled by “new faiths”: Russian Communism, German 
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Nazism, and Japanese militarism. America could not just sit back and allow this to happen; 
the country needed to mobilize and to find a way of impelling its people to commit to the 
global cause. “New faiths will [again] arise to attack us and in the long run we will 
succumb,” Dulles wrote. “The impact of the dynamic upon the static—while it may be 
resisted in detail—will ultimately destroy that which it attacks.”2 
 Dulles’s argument fused his evolving engagement with Christian ecumenism with the 
central lesson he had derived from a period spent studying with Henri Bergson at the 
Sorbonne. Bergson had persuaded Dulles that the world was in a constant state of flux and 
that any attempts to constrain it would fail.3 Dulles might have been advocating religion as a 
positive force in international relations, but he was doing so as part of a much longer 
intellectual process that stretched back to his formative years and that, in the 1930s, had 
focused on issues such as the danger posed by emerging nations in a world-system designed 
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to be static, the capacity of false deities driven by nationalist ambitions to transcend borders, 
and the need to find an alternative that could combat these processes. 
It is an insight that provides a useful starting point for rethinking Dulles’s engagement 
with Christian ecumenism. While scholars have long-recognized that religion came to play an 
important part in Dulles’s worldview—particularly following his attendance at the Oxford 
World Ecumenical Conference in 1937—they have disagreed over the exact nature of this 
engagement.4 Mark Toulouse has seen substantial “discontinuities” between the Dulles of the 
1930s and that who served as secretary of state under Dwight Eisenhower, a transition that he 
explains as being a product of significant shifts in Dulles’s religious outlook that took him 
from being an adherent of “prophetic realism” to one of “priestly nationalism.”5 Andrew 
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Preston and William Inboden, by contrast, have argued for continuity in Dulles’s engagement 
with religion. Inboden suggests that Dulles’s positions did alter, but that this was more of an 
“evolution” than a “conversion” and can be best understood by his changing professional 
circumstances. Preston adopts a similar stance and notes that religion remained at the heart of 
his worldview. The later Dulles, he argues, simply took these earlier positions to their 
“logical extremes.”6 Michael Thompson’s study disputes the idea of Dulles ever being a 
sincere exponent of ecumenism and, instead, argues that he “‘Americanized’ ecumenical 
internationalism” for political and pragmatic purposes.7 Ronald Pruessen has portrayed 
Dulles as playing a major role in the ecumenist movement that took shape in the late 1930s 
and after. However, he also sees this as being more of a “stylistic change”. Dulles, he argues, 
was still trying to solve the same problems; he was just doing so in a different guise than 
before and was still inclined to see the solution to challenges facing the world in economic 
terms.8 Richard Immerman, finally, adopts a different stance—one that helps to open up the 
space to understand Dulles more fully. Rather than suggesting that Dulles’s engagement with 
religion at Oxford came to define his entire approach to international matters, Immerman 
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suggests that Dulles’s experiences serving on behalf of the religious community drove him to 
create the sort of world in which Christian principles could flourish while recognizing that, in 
the short-term, this would need to be achieved by pursuing what he refers to as an “Empire of 
Security”.9 
 As these disagreements suggest, scholars have disagreed over the exact nature of 
Dulles’s engagement with religion and the way that it affected his thinking. In particular, they 
have found it difficult to explain the abundant contradictions that were a major part of 
Dulles’s character—an advocate of ecumenism and critic of the nation-state yet a strident 
believer in American exceptionalism; a vocal spokesperson against portraying other nations 
as problems or “devil nations” but who would do precisely that during the Cold War; and the 
figure most heavily associated with the policy of Massive Retaliation in the 1950s yet who 
believed that nuclear weapons were morally troubling.10 Indeed, Dulles has often defied 
simple categorization. It is a point highlighted by Ronald Pruessen in his comprehensive 
study of Dulles’s early life. Dulles, he argued, was a brilliant thinker and highly perceptive 
when it came to identifying major problems, but he was much less adept at solving them and 
was too often “focused on rather narrow programs as likely solutions to fundamental 
problems.” “What Dulles’s behavior before 1952 suggests in the end,” Pruessen writes, “is 
something that might be called ‘intellectual brinkmanship.’ He went to the edge of an 
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understanding of some of the profound problems of the twentieth-century world—and then 
either stopped or turned back.”11 
The present article will seek to bridge the divide between these various interpretations 
by focusing on the way that Dulles’s engagement with religion intersected with a much larger 
and consistently evolving worldview that was primarily geared toward creating a sustainable 
system of international “peace”.12 More specifically, it will argue that the key to 
understanding Dulles’s engagement with religion is to draw out his engagement with the 
working methods and ideals of American Pragmatism. Though he was by no means an 
unquestioning adherent of the philosophy shaped by C.S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey 
and Jane Addams, among others, he did have a long-standing commitment to some of its core 
principles: the idea that beneficial change could be achieved through an individual’s actions 
and beliefs; that progress could be secured by adopting a trial-and-error approach to problem-
solving; and that sweeping ideological positions should, if possible, be avoided.13 Several 
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existing works on Dulles have referenced some of these features, but bringing them together, 
under the banner of Pragmatism, helps us to get a much sharper sense of Dulles’s thinking.14 
 This is particularly true of his engagement with religion in the 1930s. The Oxford 
Conference, as we shall see, was part of a much longer process. From 1935 onwards, Dulles 
painstakingly sought to determine how long-term peace could become a reality. As he did so 
he utilized the working methods of Pragmatism, and when he came to consider the question 
of religion he was prone to do so by using highly similar phrases to those deployed by 
William James in his own writings on the subject. At the same time, he was also influenced 
by a transnational network of other likeminded figures. While Oxford was the most obvious 
example of this, he was also part of a larger discussion taking place between those like 
British observers Arnold Toynbee, Lionel Curtis, and Lord Lothian, and, in the United States, 
figures such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Clarence Streit.  
When Dulles came to embrace religion in the late 1930s, then, it was because he had 
come to believe that it could serve to motivate people to embrace the prospect of peace. It is a 
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point echoed by his son, Avery, who noted in an oral history interview that his father was 
concerned with Christianity “from the standpoint of its practical fruits” and due to his belief 
that it could do “something in world affairs which nothing else was able to do.”15 Religion, 
Dulles believed, could serve as a transnational force that could help to capture peoples’ hearts 
and minds, to move them away from their dangerous faith in the nation-state, and toward 
accepting the idea that an effective world-system would require global compromise and 
cooperation.  
 
When Pragmatism is used to describe foreign relations it is typically in a reductive way—in 
the sense that someone is realistic and prioritizes results over entrenched beliefs. As James 
Kloppenberg has argued, there is a world of difference between “such vulgar pragmatism” 
and a more philosophical approach that “embraces uncertainty, provisionality, and the 
continuous testing of hypotheses through experimentation.”16  
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Dulles’s most direct engagement with Pragmatism came during his undergraduate 
studies at Princeton University where he majored in Philosophy. Though Princeton was 
hardly a hotbed of Pragmatism—other institutions, chiefly Harvard, Chicago and Columbia, 
were far more prominent in this respect—it was nevertheless a topic that Dulles focused on at 
several points during his undergraduate studies and that saw him engage with the ideas of 
William James.17 In one essay, for instance, Dulles pondered whether it was possible to 
believe something that was not known to be true. Oftentimes, he wrote, “we make our world 
of reality harmonize with our beliefs and do not discard the beliefs because they fail to 
harmonize with what we have believed before.”18 In making the point Dulles quoted James 
approvingly; it was also a point that James had dwelt on in the “Will to Believe”. “I live,” 
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James wrote, “by the practical faith that we must go on experiencing and thinking over our 
experience, for only thus can our opinions grow more true.”19 
Dulles, however, was not an unquestioning adherent of James. In his senior thesis he 
adopted a tough and critical approach, outlining what he saw as being Pragmatism’s flaws.20 
His major complaint was that Pragmatism seemed to advocate constant change irrespective of 
whether it led to improvements. But, he continued, this could be overcome “if the pragmatist 
holds that in shaping reality some plan is followed, if the successive editions of reality form a 
progress, not a mere change.”21 For Dulles, then, there was a need for Pragmatism to be seen 
as working toward a logical end—changing the world to improve it and admitting that belief 
had to go hand-in-hand in with reason in seeking to solve pressing problems and understand 
the human condition.22 
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From his engagement with Pragmatism at Princeton—an engagement that would 
remain his most direct intellectual interaction with the works of James—Dulles retained an 
adherence to the philosophy’s working methods. The most important of these would be the 
twin-ideas that the world was in a constant state of flux, and that the way to combat this was 
not by imposing fixed systems of governance, but through trial and error and moving toward 
a more flexible model.23 Furthermore, he also embraced the Pragmatist’s idea that it was 
within an individual’s capacity to effect positive change through their actions.24  
After leaving Princeton and training as a lawyer, Dulles secured a post with the 
prominent New York law firm Sullivan and Cromwell, and, through family connections in 
Woodrow Wilson’s State Department, a place as a junior member of the U.S. delegation to 
the Versailles Peace Conference. Much of his time in France was spent working on the issue 
of reparations, but he also witnessed the difficulties that Wilson had in securing international 
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acceptance of his peace plan due to the absence of something that would persuade nations to 
think beyond their own interests.25 
 For most of the 1920s Dulles, like most Republicans, bought into the concept of a 
sustainable world order shaped by economic prosperity.26 Greater financial 
interconnectedness and trade, Dulles believed, if coupled with an open-minded approach to 
legal treaties, war debts, and reparations would lead to widespread prosperity and peace.27 
Yet he was also prone to outbursts about structural economic problems that he saw as being 
caused by excessive government oversight.28 
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 He was greatly concerned about the economic legacies of the war—the substantial 
war debts accrued by the Allies and the reparation payments that had been imposed on 
Germany.29 When France and Belgium occupied the Rhineland in 1923 following Germany’s 
failure to meet these payments, Dulles travelled to Europe in order to help broker a solution.30 
His approach when doing so was to avoid sweeping solutions and encourage the respective 
leaders to reach a compromise.31 
 The importance of this fairly minor intervention in European politics is that when 
faced with particular problems—in this case the difficulties in persuading competing nations 
to compromise over financial and political matters—he reflexively reached for Pragmatist 
working methods. He avoided emotive and dogmatic positions, sought to find a way of 
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bringing the different parties together through trial and error, and set out his view that by 
compromising all the interested parties could achieve their aims. He would work in much the 
same way when the onset of the Great Depression compelled him to think more expansively 
about international order.  
  
From his position working on Wall St., Dulles observed the way that a series of financial 
panics and partial recoveries coalesced into something larger and more ruinous.32 It led him 
to reflect far more widely on the problem of peace. He would retain his belief in the United 
States, but he would also reach back to the lessons of his formative years and the experiences 
of Versailles in a more concerted fashion than previously. The result was a period of detailed 
reflection and thought—slowly developing his ideas, probing and questioning, receiving 
feedback, and piecing together a new approach that could combat the dangerous tensions that 
had emerged in the wake of the global economic collapse.  
The 1920s were an era that saw broad support for pacifism, particularly among 
mainline Christian churches, with many people seeing armed conflict as “unthinkable” in the 
aftermath of the Great War.33 Indeed, many of Dulles’s contemporaries were themselves 
drawn to pacifistic ideals. Dulles’s own view, though, was that it was presently futile to try 
and outlaw conflict. Previous attempts had failed, he argued, because efforts such as the 
League of Nations or the Kellogg-Briand Pact had focused on preserving the status quo rather 
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than providing for change.34 In a piece for the Christian Science Monitor in 1928 Dulles 
noted that the recently signed Kellogg-Briand pact was severely limited. “So long as the 
public sentiment of the world is what it is,” Dulles wrote, “no treaty can make future war 
wholly impossible.”35  
 A series of early efforts to help salve the consequences of the financial crash—a call 
for a League of Nations committee that would encourage cooperation in international 
financial disputes; an attempt to broker deals between a series of American banks and the 
Reichsbank in Berlin—collapsed as a result of nations putting their own interests first. Dulles 
also decried Franklin Roosevelt’s sabotage of an economic conference in London as being 
typical of a dangerous global emphasis on national self-interest.36 
Dulles was not alone in seeing the rise of nationalism as being deeply problematic; he 
began to be influenced in important ways by his intersections with other likeminded 
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observers.37 Though his career before this point had seen him interact sporadically with heads 
of state and politicians, his audience had essentially been confined to that available to a Wall 
St lawyer. But he was extremely well-connected. Editors of major journals welcomed 
submissions from him; he had numerous contacts in the U.S. and in Europe; and he would 
publish his first book, War, Peace or Change, to some success in 1939 and emerge as a key 
figure in the burgeoning ecumenical movement.  
 The prominent British historian, Arnold Toynbee, the inaugural holder of the 
Stevenson Chair in international history at the LSE, and author of the twelve-volume account, 
A Study of History, was a vital figure on this front. Toynbee was highly pessimistic about the 
West’s chances of survival and believed that the desires of rising nations needed to be met if 
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war was to be avoided.38 While he saw religion as having the potential to serve as a 
constructive force on this front, he was unsure whether his own faith—Christianity, which he 
had recently rediscovered—had sufficient prominence to achieve this due to its increasing 
marginalization.39 With Islam, Buddhism and Confucianism believed to be going the same 
way, Toynbee suggested Hinduism and Soviet Communism as the likely alternatives. At this 
stage, he was inclined more toward the latter as he did not believe that “Western society, even 
its dotage, will worship divinities with six arms and legs.”40  
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 Toynbee’s chief concern was the rise of nationalism. It was a point he outlined starkly 
in a note for a roundtable discussion on the “Disintegration of the Modern World Order” that 
he chaired in the summer of 1932. The growing prominence of nationalism—or tribalism—
Toynbee argued was a direct cause of the worsening international situation and was attacking 
democracy. The solution was, thus, a fairly simple one: “The world must either get rid of 
democracy, which is impossible, or it must get rid of tribalism.”41 What was needed, then, 
was an international system that provided some mechanism by which nationalism could be 
tempered and human agency could be empowered (a sentiment that Toynbee, like Dulles, had 
drawn from studying the work of Bergson).42 Absent this, as he wrote in an essay published 
in 1936, the desire of emergent nations to challenge those at the top would inevitably lead to 
war. “Collective security without peaceful change,” he wrote, “would be like a boiler without 
a safety-valve. In preventing perpetual escapes of steam it would merely be boiling up for a 
final shattering explosion.”43 
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   Toynbee’s assessments contained two elements—the problem of factoring change 
into an essentially static world and the role that religion might play in shaping international 
society—that would prove important in Dulles’s attempts to tackle the problem of peace. But 
it would take over two years for his ideas on this front to come together. His first serious 
attempt came soon after the Nazis’ rise to power in Germany, Japan’s aggressive incursions 
into Chinese territory, and Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia. In an essay published in the Atlantic 
Monthly in October 1935, Dulles took issue with the way that the world’s major nations had 
responded to these events and accused them of seeking to prevent any transferral of power. 
The leaders of the great powers, Dulles wrote, had resorted to the “time-honored expedient of 
postulating a ‘personal devil’.” The real cause of present tensions, Dulles charged, lay in the 
“inevitability of change” and the fact that the present system sought to repress this. 
Irresistible forces were being “temporarily dammed up” and would eventually break through 
with “violence.”44 
 Seeking to persuade other nations to heed this warning, he acknowledged, was sure to 
be difficult. “Those whose lives fall in pleasant places contemplate with equanimity an 
indefinite continuation of their present state,” he wrote. But Germany, Japan and Italy were 
not “inherently warlike or bloodthirsty”; they simply felt that their potential was being 
stymied within the present framework. Consequently, there was a need for those presently 
supportive of the status quo to accept steady modifications, and for those pressing for change 
to submit to those taking place gradually rather than immediately. “Patience,” he wrote, “is 
indispensible to peace” and national leaders must prove willing to forego “opportunities to 
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take all the credit and shift all the blame.” Still, this would take time. “Many years must 
elapse before the hearts and minds of men are so changed that self-restraint and self-sacrifice 
can be relied upon to assure orderly evolution within the society of nations.”45 
 This first attempt to tackle the problems of the 1930s did not offer much in terms of a 
concrete solution. Certain principles and ideals were clearly apparent—greater economic 
fluidity, increased international cooperation, the need for major powers to relinquish their 
stranglehold on power—but there was little sense, yet, as to how they might be translated into 
a workable model. Furthermore, as a number of correspondents who read the piece told him 
afterwards, there was a need for something that could persuade self-interested nations to 
accept his arguments. The president of Rutgers University, for example, wrote to Dulles and 
noted that the piece had left him “a little discouraged” due to the fact that he doubted “if the 
nations of the world will be willing to take an intelligence compromising attitude toward 
other nations...in time to forestall the next war.”46 
 As his thinking developed, therefore, it was increasingly aimed at defining a model 
that could transcend borders and cultivate a world opinion more receptive to ceding national 
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interest to promote greater international cooperation. Dulles picked up on this in a speech at 
Princeton in 1936. Some of the key features from his earlier essay—particularly his view that 
“change is omnipresent and the status quo is never maintained”—remained unaltered. At the 
same time, Dulles also engaged much more closely with Woodrow Wilson’s model than he 
had previously. Furthermore, elements of his engagement with Pragmatist thinking set out in 
his senior thesis—not least the fact that beliefs and emotions had to be married to logic and 
reason—were clearly evident. Understanding the nature of change, he suggested, had to 
combine reason with the nature of human desire that was far less predictable. All of us, he 
told his audience, “act primarily in response to appetites, habits, instincts, emotions and other 
non-rational stimuli... all indicative of the subjection of human action to forces other than 
pure reason.” Violence and war could not be rationalized out of existence; the only solution 
was to “discover the restraining envelope” and “provide outlets such that the dynamic forces 
become peacefully diffused.”47  
Dulles was echoing both Bergson and Toynbee here. In particular, he was drawing on 
Bergson’s firm belief that the universe was shaped by “never-ending change.”48 But, just as 
importantly, he was also echoing the view of James in the “Will to Believe” who had noted 
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that “we find our passional nature influencing us in our opinions.”49 This fusion of Pragmatist 
working methods and the influence of other interested observers led Dulles to call for 
Wilson’s model to be re-evaluated.50 Wilson’s approach to international security, Dulles 
argued, had demonstrated the way that issues such as economics, colonialism and 
international law could be framed so as to ensure that they were not dominated by hidebound 
national self-interest. He had shown how national borders could be rendered unproblematic. 
This was undoubtedly a dramatic overstatement on Dulles’s part; it portrayed Wilson’s 
approach in a way that was barely believable. Nonetheless, it served a useful intellectual 
purpose for Dulles. “In a world where boundaries would thus cease to be barriers,” he 
explained, “war would have no further legitimate place.” And yet it was vital that this was not 
seen as a simple, sweeping model intended to promote peace through the League of Nations. 
Wilson’s model could have worked, but only if the entire framework had been implemented. 
The League was the last of Wilson’s fourteen points, he said, because its success was 
contingent upon the other thirteen being implemented. “The elimination of war was 
appropriate only as channels were otherwise provided for the peaceful diffusion of dynamic 
forces.”51 
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Consequently, the goal was to create a “reasonably flexible world.” Great impetus for 
this could come in the economic sphere where stable and interchangeable currencies needed 
to be re-established, tariffs and quotas rejected, and the international movement of people 
made easier. Politically, the situation was more difficult due to the unwillingness of nations to 
cede any real power. One way around this, Dulles nonetheless argued, was to ensure that 
treaties be open to renegotiation after a period of time. Another option was the greater use of 
“unwritten laws” such as those seen in the evolution of the British Empire into the 
Commonwealth. “If we establish reasonable freedom for the movement of goods, capital and 
people, boundary lines lose much of their significance,” he summarized.52 
 However, while the speech evidenced clear signs of his thoughts evolving, it did not 
tackle the problem that Dulles’s interlocutors had pinpointed following the publication of his 
essay in the Atlantic Monthly: how would it prove possible to compel other nations to agree? 
This model, Dulles conceded, would “not arouse enthusiasm as would a frontal attack on 
war” and would fail to “arouse the righteous fervor which comes only from hand to hand 
conflict with the forces of evil.”53 
 Wilson had faced a similar problem: his model of peace had contained little, beyond 
the enthusiasm with which he was greeted when he arrived in Europe in 1918, to suggest that 
it could draw public opinion away from national self-interest. At one point, self-
determination had seemed as if it could generate support for the Wilson vision of peace. Yet, 






while it proved initially popular in far-flung places like India, Korea and China, it soon fell 
out of favor when the barriers to its acceptance became clear.54 Indeed, as Erez Manela has 
demonstrated, self-determination did not work as Wilson had intended. He had hoped it 
would capture the minds of people across the world—and across borders—and begin a 
gradual move toward decolonization; instead, his ideas prompted a swift drive for 
independence as the colonial powers’ antipathy toward them took shape and led to a 
subsequent hardening of nationalist sentiments.55  
This, Dulles suggested, had resulted in a similar outcome to the Kellogg-Briand pact: 
a system that had essentially reinforced the control of the world’s major powers and 
suppressed people’s desire for autonomy. “The mandatory powers,” Dulles argued, had 
remained “absolute sovereigns” and the system had merely confirmed “the old concept of 
national domain.”56 Nevertheless, he was not entirely pessimistic; prudent actions by the 
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colonial powers could serve to alter the prevailing situation. If the British, for example, 
proved they were willing to cede control in certain areas then both former colonies and rising 
world powers would perceive that there was the prospect for change in the international 
system. When Supreme Court Justice Harlan Stone wrote to him after reading the speech and 
suggested that the British were in no way ready to give serious consideration to this, Dulles 
responded by noting that he believed that “there is a very substantial body of English opinion 
which favors something of the sort.” There was also a precedent to support this contention: in 
1932 Britain had freely withdrawn from Iraq, and proved willing to fight the League of 
Nations to push it through.57 
By the end of 1936 Dulles was moving toward a model of what a functioning 
international system might look like. However, he was yet to define a system of peace that 
could capture peoples’ hearts and minds and persuade them to renounce their adherence to 
the nation-state. Addressing this was vital if his vision was to have any hope of succeeding. It 
would be in the following year that his approach would take a large step forward—as his 
Pragmatist approach to problem solving combined with the influence of a transnational 
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network of like-minded observers to persuade Dulles that the answer to his conundrum could 
be found in Christian ecumenism.  
 
The Oxford Conference came at an opportune time as, by 1937, Dulles, like many other 
similarly-minded observers, was growing alarmed at the rapid rise of pro-isolationist—or 
pro-neutralist—sentiment within the U.S.58 It was a trend that Dulles found to be deeply 
worrisome. The desire to remain “aloof” from international events was only acceptable, he 
wrote in a piece for The Nation, if the goal was to bring about “the indefinite perpetuation of 
an existing status” and keep power in the hands of those already in possession of it. A 
sustainable international peace could only be secured, he wrote, “by realizing...a system 
which will strike a fair balance between the static and dynamic and afford the latter an 
adequate opportunity for peaceful expression.”59 
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The goal of Oxford was to respond to the dangers posed by Nazi Germany and the 
attempt by Adolf Hitler’s government to ally the German state with Christian nationalism—a 
move that, to many, highlighted the way that God had been replaced by the state in the 
affections of mankind.60 Dulles mixed with an array of important internationalist figures—
from Joseph Oldham, Lionel Curtis, Alfred Zimmern, and Lord Lothian on the British side, to 
Reinhold Niebuhr, Henry Van Dusen, and Henry Sloane Coffin from the U.S., as well as a 
host of delegates from fifty four other countries. This multi-national cast of participants, 
however, only had a limited impact on the conference’s focus. Though much would be said in 
Oxford about a global movement for peace, the conference was overwhelmingly influenced 
by “an Anglo-American alliance” (indeed, roughly half of the four hundred delegates hailed 
from Britain or the U.S.).61 The transatlantic emphasis was nevertheless vital for Dulles. It 
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allowed him to see how a sweeping transnational idea like Christian ecumenism could be 
mobilized while remaining true to Western ideals.62  
Consequently, Oxford provided the bridge between the revised version of Wilsonian 
internationalism and Dulles’s search for something larger that could compel other nations to 
accede to his model. In that sense, it was less a spiritual reawakening and more an intellectual 
progression.63 This does not, however, mean that Dulles was being cynical or insincere; 
religious belief and intellectual engagement with Pragmatism, as the case of James amply 
demonstrates, were hardly mutually exclusive.64 Yet it is to argue that Dulles’s embracement 
of religion took shape in a manner that owed more to Pragmatism than scripture. Dulles was 
very well-versed in his religion, after all, and it had featured prominently during his 
childhood growing up as the son of a liberal-minded Presbyterian minister in upstate New 
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York.65 His turn to it in 1937 was because it offered a logical step forward. If Christian 
ecumenism could be used to counter the dangerous drift toward deification of the state, and if 
by doing so other aspects of his model were embraced, the resultant period of improving 
relations could be seen as a direct consequence of religious belief.  
The catalyst for Dulles’s progression was the conference’s working group on the 
Church and the World of Nations. Dulles’s views figured prominently in the final report—
unlike those of some of the other participants such as Lord Lothian—and it highlighted 
several areas that enabled Dulles to see how religion could persuade people in different 
nations to abandon nationalism.66 The major problem, the report noted, was that the basis of 
the existing system—international law—had “not commanded general respect because it 
originates in a sphere remote from ordinary men and women and has not yet been brought 
into effective touch with their social consciousness.”67 The only viable answer was for 
nations to sacrifice individual sovereignty to a federal system or an organization like a 
revised League of Nations. Here, it was argued, the Christian Church could play a key role: 
“All law, international as well as national, must be based on a common ethos—that is, a 
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common foundation of moral convictions. To the creation of such a common foundation in 
moral conviction the Church as a supranational society with a profound sense of the historical 
realities, and of the worth of human personality, has a great contribution to make.”68 
Presently, the only ways that change could be brought about were through “voluntary 
action or by force”; there was no mechanism for information or views to be promulgated that 
advocated peaceful change. In order to address this problem, the report suggested, it was vital 
that the people be mobilized to put pressure on their respective governments and “make it 
clear that they are prepared to accept temporary sacrifices in order that a greater good may 
ultimately emerge.”69 
It was this focus on individual actions, a sense of sacrifice, and the idea that people 
could affect government actions that had the greatest impact on Dulles. He had referenced it 
during a radio address on NBC prior to his departure for Europe. To be a Christian, Dulles 
stated, had become meaningless. “For the individual to be enrolled as a Christian was not only 
respectable but advantageous...it seemed that Christians need no longer struggle or 
sacrifice...[and] no religion can survive as an effective influence unless it demands and 
receives sacrifice.” This had led, in part, to the rise of new “religions” in countries like Italy, 
Germany and Russia where the State was now “deified”. To counter this, Dulles told his 
listeners, people should be prepared to sacrifice national interest and “pride”. “The immediate 
                                                 
68 Ibid, 173-4 
 
69 Ibid, 173-4 
 
task,” he told them, “relates to fundamentals. It is to increase the intensity of Christian 
belief.”70 
He reaffirmed many of these points at greater length in an article written after Oxford 
and published in Religion in Life. He had gone to Oxford, Dulles wrote, because “it seemed to 
me that I might find there the answer to certain questions which perplexed me.” More 
specifically, it had helped to reaffirm his faith that the churches could be utilized “to lift 
mankind from those morasses of which the underlying cause is usually moral decay.” After 
World War One, he wrote, the basic features of Christianity had been ignored, and “the 
‘State’ was personified, even deified, as the sole source of human salvation.” Rectifying this, 
Dulles continued, had to be driven by mankind’s willingness to take religion seriously—to see 
belief not as something easy and comforting, but as a wholehearted commitment requiring 
complete devotion. “It had become conventional and even socially and materially 
advantageous to become an enrolled Christian.”71 
To be sure, there was a degree of irony in evidence here as Dulles’s own faith had 
lapsed for most of his adult life. But this is to overlook the way that Dulles came to conceive 
of religion. As he came to see the role that the Church might play in international affairs, 
Dulles was reaching back to his formative years and echoing William James. “May not 
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religious optimism be too idyllic,” James wrote in Pragmatism. “Must all be saved? Is no 
price to be paid in the work of salvation? Is the last word sweet?”72 For Dulles, as for James, 
there was a sense that religion—if it was to have any utility—required a form of sacrifice. “I 
find myself willing to take the universe to be really dangerous and adventurous,” James 
wrote, “...I am willing that there should be real losses and real losers....”73 Embracing such 
principles also required sacrifice. It would do little good, after all, if Dulles gestured toward 
these principles without committing; people would soon see through it and it would jibe with 
the idea that you needed to live the change you wanted to see. Someone who did commit, 
James wrote, would be a “genuine pragmatist” and “willing to pay with his own person, if 
need be, for the realization of the ideals which he frames.”74 As he came to incorporate 
religion more fully into his thinking, therefore, Dulles was also compelled to embrace this and 
give himself the “will to believe”.  
Dulles was not the only key figure to come out of the Oxford Conference with a 
sharper sense of the role the church could play in the pursuit of peace. Reinhold Niebuhr, the 
prominent theologian and Professor of Divinity at the Union Theological Seminary, was a key 
participant at Oxford and the conference helped him to articulate what would become known 
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as Christian realism. Niebuhr had also been heavily influenced by William James on the issue 
of religion: he agreed that belief could be justified even in the absence of definitive proof, and 
that truth was something to be worked toward rather than an incontrovertible fact.75 Yet 
Niebuhr took a very different course to Dulles. Increasingly, Niebuhr came to believe in the 
concept of original sin—that true evil exists in the world and is commonplace—and that it 
was not possible to eradicate this through enlightened policymaking.76 This, in turn, led him 
to believe that in order to face up to this threat it would be necessary to renounce pacifism, 
embrace the “lesser evil”, and be willing to go to war. At the same time, Niebuhr remained 
strongly opposed to the deployment of nationalism in seeking to destroy evil. A jingoistic war 
movement, he warned, would simply cast the United States and its allies in the same light as 
the Axis powers. War might need to be waged, but it should be done so judiciously and in a 
manner that avoided any sense of American exceptionalism.77 Dulles, by contrast, continued 
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to believe that it was possible to avoid war, rejected the idea of embracing lesser evil in order 
to combat Nazism and Fascism, and, most importantly, retained a very firm belief in the 
innate superiority of American values and ideals. There were points of convergence in their 
thought—both, for example, believed that religion could be used to mobilize society in ways 
that made it more likely to accept internationalism—but, for the most part, they pursued 
different paths with respect to religion’s role in international affairs. One explanation for this 
is that they were coming at it from different ends of the political spectrum; whereas Dulles 
remained a right-leaning conservative, Niebuhr was far more at home on the left of American 
politics (while remaining critical of the left’s fondness for idealism).78  
Oxford’s impact on Dulles became clear with the publication of his first book, War, 
Peace or Change, in 1939. War, Dulles wrote early on, would be extremely difficult to 
eradicate and could not be “accomplished by the stroke of a pen or by the wish of a heart. We 
cannot remove force and leave a vacuum.” What was needed, Dulles wrote, was to “substitute 
force for some other procedures” and to define a solution that combined “ethical” and 
“political” features. Achieving this would be difficult; so far it had proven impossible to 
reconcile them in a manner that avoided the trenchancy of Fascism or Communism. His 
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solution came in two parts: first, the “human spirit” had to be molded so “that desires tend to 
become reconcilable and harmonious”, and second, a system had to be created that provided 
“some alternative to force as the way of determining which, of subsisting conflicting desires, 
shall prevail.”79  
He remained cautious about his plan’s implementation. “We must be content with 
slow progress,” he wrote, “and even this requires that intelligence rather than emotion should 
be our guide.” Here, again, he returned to the dichotomy he had set out in his senior thesis, 
which had called for an approach that married aspects of Pragmatism with logic. This was 
crucial, he argued, for the task at hand was to revolutionize the relationship between the 
individual and the state, which presently had resulted in the latter’s “extreme personification” 
and had led to a shutting off of trans-border cooperation. Fascism and Communism had 
shown how national borders could be “peacefully penetrated”, but neither of them had yet 
managed to “transcend nationalism”. Here, as with his statements on the transnational 
capacity of Wilson’s model, there was a sense of hyperbole evident in Dulles’s argument. Yet 
it was a stance that was also consistent with Dulles’s neutrality at this time, his generally 
sympathetic stance toward Germany, and the argument he had made in 1936 that Italy’s 
invasion of Abyssinia was understandable in light of the broader international situation.80 His 
thoughts on these fronts led to a cautious conclusion: hope for the ethical solution would have 
                                                 
79 John Foster Dulles, War, Peace & Change (London, 1939), 7-16 
 
80 Pruessen, Road to Power..., 181-5; Immerman, Empire for Liberty..., 175 
 
to be tempered as the dominance of “personified states” ensured it would prove difficult to 
persuade nations to sacrifice their own interests.81 
But what, in precise terms, was Dulles suggesting here? With respect to the “ethical 
principle” he outlined three key issues. First, the compulsion to see other nations as “devil-
nations”—that is, nations that were believed to be the enemy incarnate (a recommendation not 
without irony given Dulles’s view of the Soviet Union during the Cold War)—had to stop. 
Second, people had to stop seeing nation-states as replacement “deities” and a substitute for 
“some spiritual ideal which transcends national lines.” Third, there needed to be a push for an 
international system that was open and encouraged equal opportunities. By adopting these 
measures, he wrote, “we may diminish the sense of dependence on one’s own state as a 
necessary agency for combating the selfishness and arbitrariness of others.” Religion would 
be vital here. People needed some form of spiritual allegiance to get them to look beyond the 
nation-state and conceive of something higher.82 
With progress certain to be slow, some form of control would be necessary. However, 
Dulles argued, this could not be akin to the old model where the strongest nations had held the 
power and aspirant nations had seen their ambitions frustrated. Success would require a 
willingness to sacrifice immediate interests. A possible way forward, he suggested, was 
Article XIX of the League of Nations Covenant. In its call for treaties to be subject to 
renegotiation, it showed how international disputes could be settled without recourse to 
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violence. Both the United States and the British Empire, Dulles wrote, had demonstrated in 
the past how “peaceful and non-disturbing evolution could occur in the world as a whole if we 
had fewer treaties, and if those which we had were less permanent and more conducive to the 
development of a flexible body of international practice which might ultimately become so 
grounded in the mores of the world community as to attain the status of law.” Hence, a new 
organization, which addressed the flaws of the League, could be constructed, and provide a 
forum in which change could be managed through negotiation.83 
Dulles was putting forward an approach that had evolved throughout the 1930s, in 
which he believed religion could play a key role in encouraging greater acceptance of his 
ideas. Furthermore, in keeping with Pragmatist principles, he was setting this out as an 
approach that could not, at this point, solve everything. To the contrary, it was a model that 
would test and probe, encourage through practical demonstration, and gradually evolve. At 
this time, Dulles wrote, it was not possible to “attain a solution which is perfect or final.” 
Religious, humanitarian and peace organizations already existed, he argued, that could work 
effectively to start to “vitalize ideals which will transcend national lines”. And while this 
could not be implemented immediately, moves to encourage this would, assuredly, lead to 
success in the future. “Only as progress is made”, he concluded, “will it be possible more 
boldly and more surely to attack and solve the last international phase of the primitive 
problem of eliminating force as the solvent of conflicting desires.”84 
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By the time the book was published, Dulles had come to see religion—and, 
specifically, Christian ecumenism—as having a key part to play in developing a viable 
structure of peace. Yet he continued to adopt the working methods of Pragmatism. He did not 
see the ideas set out in his book as the final word on the issue; they moved things forward and 
evidenced signs of progress, but were partial steps toward something better. To that end, he 
continued to engage with ideas being put forward by other prominent figures. 
Important examples of this are Lionel Curtis and Clarence Streit. The three of them, in 
fact, represented an important strand in Christian and internationalist thought which believed 
that a functioning internationalist system should embrace the idea of federalism (though this 
was not a universally held view and other groups differed markedly in their views).85 While 
both ultimately advocated very different models to Dulles, their ideas nevertheless helped him 
to refine his views.  
Curtis, a British academic and ardent supporter of the Commonwealth, was a 
prominent voice in calling for the Church to play a role in shaping international society. In his 
three-volume history of human civilization, Civitas Dei, Curtis called for a Christian 
Commonwealth: a community of nations, forsaking national sovereignty, and abiding by the 
word of God to foster peace, harmony and prosperity. The hope for mankind, he wrote in the 
third volume, was the creation of “a human society based on the laws of God, on the one 
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abiding reality, the infinite duty of men to God, of one to another.”86 He outlined his thoughts 
more fully in an appearance before the Council on Foreign Relations in early 1939, in a 
session chaired by Dulles. In his talk, Curtis drew on his belief in federalized political systems 
and the power of religion to provide an answer as to what could be done to prevent the 
outbreak of war. “There will be no world peace,” Curtis said, “until there is a World 
Commonwealth based on the principles of the Federalist Papers”. “The world today,” Curtis 
continued, “is obsessed by the idea of the national state. Perhaps tomorrow we shall find it 
possible to think that two or more states can merge into a World Commonwealth without 
losing their freedom.” Herein, Curtis argued, lay the only real hope for avoiding war. Nations 
had to be persuaded to cede their own selfish interests and cooperate. In the discussion that 
followed, Curtis went further in identifying what sort of principles could guide this 
transnational partnership. When asked if the “Christian Church could start the ball rolling”, 
Curtis responded enthusiastically. “I think that the Church would be an excellent agency. For 
by a World Commonwealth I mean the Sermon on the Mount translated into political 
terms.”87 
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Curtis and Dulles knew one another and were heavily influenced by each other’s 
ideas. In 1937 Curtis sent Dulles a copy of Civitas Dei. The book, Dulles wrote, was 
“exceedingly stimulating” and “had appreciably influenced my thinking.” His son, Avery, 
meanwhile, noted that Curtis’s work “had considerable influence on his [Foster’s]” and that 
his father would have meetings with Curtis in which he would “sort of sit at his feet and listen 
to him as to a prophet.”88 The two men corresponded throughout 1939, sharing grievances 
over how their respective books were received and bemoaning the lack of understanding with 
respect to their core ideas.89 And though Dulles would not articulate his vision of 
international order in the same way as Curtis, his interactions with him did help him to 
sharpen his own stance. A speech that Dulles gave in Hartford, Connecticut in October 1939 
saw him directly pick up on several of Curtis’s core ideas—in particular, the necessity of the 
Church playing a key role in international affairs and the lessons that could be derived from 
the Federalist Papers. Yet he also fused Curtis’s ideas with a Jamesean sense of the 
benefits—and sacrifice—of belief. Mankind, Dulles stated, needed to embrace a more vital 
form of religion, one that shunned the easy symbolism of nationalism, and that called upon 
people to embrace the notion of sacrificing themselves to something larger than the nation-
state. “I know that it is difficult to transfer devotion to that which is abstract and universal,” 
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Dulles stated, “but I also know that mankind is paying a fearful price for its worship of false 
gods and that never before did the world so need a vital belief in a universal God.”90 
Similarly, both men were enthusiastic about the ideas of Clarence Streit, an ardent 
Atlanticist and another keen observer of the international system. What Streit did that Dulles 
and Curtis had not was to provide a blueprint for a federalized international government that 
would demonstrate how national sovereignty could be ceded for the greater good. Curtis 
enthusiastically referenced Streit’s work, and both he and Dulles saw much to recommend in 
its ideas.91 The answer to the dangers facing the world, Streit wrote, was for a “Union now of 
the democracies that the North Atlantic and a thousand other things already unite.” The initial 
membership of such a group, he said, ought to comprise the United States, the British 
Commonwealth, and a number of prominent European democracies, all of whom shared 
similar traditions and customs and who, importantly, were committed to the notion of peace. 
Crisis, Streit suggested in agreement with Toynbee, Curtis, Dulles, Niebuhr and the 
participants at Oxford, had come about due the prevalence of selfish nationalism. As a result, 
it was not the dictators—Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco—that were to blame for the world’s 
ills; contemporary problems were a consequence of “the refusal of the democracies to 
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renounce enough of their national sovereignty to let effective world law and order be set 
up.”92 
Though Dulles did not frame his own vision of peace in this way, there were clear 
similarities between their perceptions of the international situation and their belief that shared 
sovereignty was a prerequisite of any solution. After reading Streit’s book, Dulles wrote to 
him and informed him that he had greatly enjoyed it. “Your basic philosophy,” Dulles wrote, 
“is much the same that which I seek to express in my ‘War, Peace and Change’.” Streit’s 
solution, though, jarred with Dulles’s preferred working methods. Noting that Streit’s model 
was “dramatic” and sweeping, Dulles explained that he would feel that “it was only 
practicable to proceed quite slowly in trying to develop a technique for extending our federal 
system.” If Streit’s model could be proven to work—if it could be successfully trialed with a 
country like Canada, say—then “it would be available for further accretions.”93 In a letter to 
Lord Lothian in 1940, meanwhile, Dulles criticized Streit’s plan for its sweeping and 
reductive nature. World peace, he remarked, would not come from blandly imitating the 
American constitution. “That is, I think, the weakness of the Streit plan. It attempts to follow 
too woodenly our particular formula.” Some form of progress was possible, Dulles continued, 
but it would have to be built on a “broader sense of responsibility” that “can be worked out 
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only gradually and perhaps in the first instance as between nations which trust each other and 
have similar political institutions.”94 
Clearly, Dulles was still seeking to determine the exact nature of his own approach. 
There was a need, as he wrote to Senator William Borah in 1939, to apply his ideas more 
assiduously as his thinking had been “somewhat philosophical and abstract rather than in 
terms of the concrete problem of what our country should do at the present time.”95 As he did 
so, however, he would consistently refer back to the idea that any attempt to develop a new 
structure of peace should be pieced together gradually. As he wrote to Professor Quincy 
Wright, a pioneering political scientist at the University of Chicago, the approach he was 
thinking of was one that would result in the creation of a series of international arrangements, 
“none of which, however, would attempt at this stage to be world-wide in its scope, but each 
of which should preferably be ‘open-ended’ and capable of extension.” If one organization—
based upon shared financial and commercial interests, for example—proved to be a success it 
could be extended; if another—based on similarity of political institutions—proved less 
successful then it would be scaled back. Trial and error, patient problem solving, and a keen 
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sense of the necessity of capturing the public mood would be the main building blocks of the 
Dulles model of peace.96 
 
Dulles’s appointment to lead the FCC Commission in 1940 provided the platform to pursue 
his vision in practice and to make the ideas he had been exploring throughout the 1930s more 
tangible.97 In combination with leading church figures, and mindful of the political audience 
that the chairmanship of the Commission had given him, Dulles and his committee worked 
assiduously to craft a blueprint for a post-war peace. His efforts saw him translate the 
outcomes of Oxford into an approach that was fixed on mobilizing the power of the 
ecumenical movement in order to “legitimize American state-run internationalism”.98  
 Dulles had always retained a strong belief in the necessity of American values and 
leadership being a key part of any viable international system. But the centrality of America 
to his proposed structure of peace grew as his professional circumstances began to change. 
Heading the FCC Commission gave him far greater prominence than had hitherto been the 
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case; it was a shift that coincided with substantial shifts in the outlook of the Republican Party 
which made him an attractive figure for GOP politicians eager to take a more internationalist 
line. The Republicans, who had generally held to a more isolationist stance in foreign affairs 
since 1920, began to embrace internationalism following Wendell Wilkie’s run for the 
presidency in 1940 and the publication of his One World three years later. Suddenly, 
internationalism appeared to be politically beneficial and necessary for leading Republicans. 
If the U.S. move away from the world in the 1920s was a contributory factor to the tensions 
that led to World War Two, Wilkie wrote in his 1943 book, then “a withdrawal from the 
problems and responsibilities of the world after this war would be sheer disaster.”99 Other 
Republicans, such as Governor of New York Thomas Dewey, were beginning to think in a 
similar vein. When Dewey announced that he would run against Franklin Roosevelt in the 
1944 presidential election he chose Dulles to serve as a key foreign policy advisor (as he 
would again in 1948).100 As Dulles moved closer to being in a position of power, his 
recommendations for a viable system of post-war peace were thus articulated more explicitly 
with reference to American leadership. 
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 Substantial changes in his professional circumstances, however, did not lead him to 
renounce the working methods that had long shaped his engagement with the problem of 
international peace. This was in spite of the fact that, in the years between 1945 and 1950, the 
emergence of the Cold War altered the international landscape dramatically. The model 
Dulles had developed through the 1930s had led to his appointment to head the FCC 
Commission; this, in turn, put him in a position whereby he could mobilize the voice of the 
Church to call for greater U.S. involvement in a sustainable post-war peace. His participation 
at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 to create the United Nations (UN) demonstrates the 
extent to which the Dulles Commission (as it came to be called) succeeded on this front. As 
Andrew Preston writes, “the publicity generated by the Commission of a Just and Durable 
Peace was an invaluable tool for educating both the public and elites about world order.”101  
 Yet Dulles retained the Pragmatist’s sense that this was not an end but rather a 
staging-post on the road to a more successful policy. In his second book, War or Peace, 
published in 1950 as he continued to grapple with the Cold War’s impact, Dulles explained 
that the UN was not intended to serve as a world government or international policeman; 
rather, it was supposed to function as a forum that shaped world opinion, adjudicated in 
international disputes, and that brought the full force of the world’s moral judgment to bear on 
aggressors. Its “primary task”, Dulles wrote, “is to create the conditions which will make 
possible a more highly developed organization. That requires developing a consensus of 
moral judgment and stimulating it into becoming an effective influence in the world 
community.”102 
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Reappraising Dulles’s engagement with Christian internationalism in the 1930s in this 
way helps us to understand more fully this often misunderstood individual. While a great deal 
of scholarship has been produced on Dulles and his approach to international matters, 
historians have nevertheless struggled to truly understand him and to make sense of his very 
different approaches to the international system throughout his career.103 By factoring his 
engagement with Pragmatism into our understanding of his thinking, however, we can 
identify a bridge between the different phases of Dulles’s life. His embracement of 
Pragmatist working methods committed Dulles to a constant testing and re-evaluation of his 
thinking: it compelled him to reconceptualize his ideas and to embrace new approaches when 
his own circumstances changed or the international system was subject to major transitions. 
Accordingly, this led him to adopt new positions and new tactics, with each phase in his 
career initiating a broad reappraisal. While the ideas and models he pursued were subject to 
change, the underlying intellectual framework was not.  
Viewing Dulles as an engaged intellectual figure with a long-standing commitment to 
the working methods of Pragmatism, moreover, provides a new way of conceiving of his 
inconsistencies and his foibles. For Dulles was both a committed exponent of the need for 
transnational forces in international affairs and a believer in American exceptionalism; he 
was both an advocate of the effectiveness of religion as a powerful force in foreign relations 
and a Pragmatist who eschewed dogma and sweeping solutions. In order to better understand 
Dulles and his importance in twentieth century U.S. foreign relations, therefore, it is 
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necessary to look more deeply into his intellectual development and influences and to draw 
out his engagement with Pragmatist principles and practices. As his son Avery later 
recollected, “I believe that the pragmatism of Bergson and James influenced his thinking, 
always—not in the sense of being a pragmatist without principles, but in the feeling that 
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